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Notes
AD Hoc RULEMAKING - RETROACTIVE
Securities and Exchange Commission disapproved the redrganization plan of the Chenery Corporation because its officers and directors had purchased a substantial amount
of existing preferred stock on the over-the-counter market and
sought to convert it into common stock of the new corporation at
a substantial profit. The commission concluded this was inconsistent with the standards set forth in Sections 7' and 112 of the
Holding Company Act,' although no specific rule prohibiting such
conduct was in force, and ordered the stock turned in on a "cost
plus 4 per cent" basis. Chenery Corporation appealed from this
order, claiming a prior Supreme Court decision 4 barred such an
order. (The Supreme Court had earlier reversed the commission's
order because it was not supported by the reasons advanced by the
commission in support of that order. The commission restated its
reasons and formulated the order in contest.) The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia upheld this contention.' On appeal
by the commission from this decision, the court of appeals was
reversed, and, after almost seven years of litigation,' it was finally
held, where the action of an administrative body is "the product of
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of the statutory policies" and is "based upon
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substantial evidence .. .consistent with the authority granted by
1. 49 Stat. 815, 15 U. S. C. A. 7 9g (1940). Section 7 provides generally
for certain declarations in respect to security transactions.
2. 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. A. 79k (1940). Section 11 provides among other
things for the submission and action on reorganization plans.
3. 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. 79 (1940).
4. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U. S.
80, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1948). This decision reversed the commission's
action as not being supported by the reasons advanced in the opinion and
remanded it.
5. Chenery Corporation v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 154 F. (2d)
6 (1946). This decision reversed the commission's order holding that the earlier
Supreme Court case precluded such action, since it would be a rule retroactively
affecting the corporation.
6. In 1987, the initial voluntary plan of reorganization was filed. Four years
later, after a great deal of controversy, an amended plan was approved in
1941. In 1942, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed that
order in very sweeping language. (Chenery Corp. v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 874, 128 F. (2d) 803 [1946]. This was
modified somewhat by the Supreme Court (See note 4, supra.). The commission
dressed up the language, came to the same conclusion and rendered an order
similar to its first one. The court of appeals again reversed (See note 5, supra.).
On certiorari the court decided the instant case.
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Congress," the agency's judgment will not be disturbed. Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (U. S. 1947).
The action of the officials in purchasing the stock was entirely
open and above board, the commission, however, decided that the
possibilities of fraud and questionable practices inherent in such
conduct justified the restraint thereof. Inasmuch as the commission
had no judicial power but only rulemaking power, its decision
was necessarily based on a rule which it created after the case had
arisen. This activity is characterized as ad hoc rulemaking.
The court gave great weight to the expertise of the commission. In matters which are too complex to permit quasi-legislative
codification until the problem under consideration is clarified and
crystallized by a series of cases, the court seemingly felt that such
ad hoc rulemaking as was practiced by the commission is better
adapted to the development of standards of policy by administrative bodies than adoption of an embracive and inelastic "rule."
The court rejected the interpretation that its decision in the first
Chenery case precluded later action by the commission because it
amounted to retroactive rulemaking, although this interpretation
was certainly justifiable under the broad language used in the
majority opinion in that case. 7 Such a construction of the earlier
decision would have severely curtailed the exercise of discretion in
individual cases by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The case represents somewhat of a departure from the traditional American distrust of everything administrative and the corollary belief that only Congress and the judiciary can safely devise
and apply standards of conduct in a particular situation.' The
court, at the same time, emphatically reiterated the need for a
recital in the written opinion of the commission that certain judgments were in fact made and a recital of the grounds upon which
they were founded. It also recognized the desirability of a general
rule. Thus, the salutary effect of directing the commission's attention to its statutory functions and the duties attendant thereon were
preserved.
There was a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Jackson in which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred. The dissenters wanted no part
7. This position is strengthened somewhat by the fact that the organ of the
court in the first case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurred in Mr. Justice
Jackson's vehement dissent reported in 67 S. Ct. 1760 (1947).
8. For an insight into this distrust see Cooper, Administrative Justice and
the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 577.
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of ad hoc rulemaking with retroactive effect; the dissent pointed
out that the decision actually represented a direct reversal of the
court's stand on such problems. It also contended that the decision
was a reversal of the 1943 decision.9
Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized the fact that no general rule
had previously been adopted because the situation involved had
never before been presented to the commission. He denied that
experience could be deferred to in a situation which had never
arisen before. This denial seemingly overlooks the fact that
expertise applies generally to familiarity in the field wherein the
problem arises, with all its ramifications, rather than to a particular situation.
This overlooked fact seems to be the true basis on which the
majority recognizes such ad hoc action in complex and technical
fact situations. Such recognition appears to be in accord with
several cases decided in the interim between the two Chenery
decisions." °
ROBERT L. ROLAND, III
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FEDERAL

RIGHTS TO TIDELANDs-The

United States brought action against the State of California, alleging
that the United States was the owner in fee simple, or possessed of
paramount rights in and power over, the land and things of value
underlying the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California beyond the
low water mark and extending three nautical miles seaward, and
that California, without the authority of the United States, had
executed certain mineral leases in this area. The prayer was for a
9. 67 S. Ct. 1760 (1947). While the majority opinion is not utterly irreconcilable with its earlier decision, it truly represents a change of attitude-hence
the significance of the decision.
10. Notably the cases of Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, 324t U. S. 826, 65 S. Ct." 855, 89 L. Ed. 1394 (1945),
where a divided court in a per curiam decision upheld the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court had upheld a commission
order denying plaintiff's application for a declaration that applicant was not
a subsidiary-such order being based on an interpretation of the words 'subject
to controlling influence' as including susceptibility to domination. There was
a dissent saying the order was arbitrary and capricious; and Republic Aviation
Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L. Ed. 1372 (1945),
in which ad hoc rulemaking of the commissign was upheld so that ". . . a 'rigid
scheme of remedies' is avoided and administrative flexibility within appropriate
statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the dominant purpose of the
legislation."
Both cases are distinguishable on their facts, but are closely in point in
principle.

